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Life, Sex, and Ambiguity
Abstract: This essay responds to Donald MacKinnon‘s influential critique of Till-
ich in his 1975 essay “Tillich, Frege, Kittel: Some Reflections on a Dark Theme,”
in which MacKinnon laments Tillich’s “failure at the level of faith” on account of
his sexual lifestyle. After outlining MacKinnon‘s argument in detail, I suggest
four possible strategies of response available to those who wish to affirm the
value of Tillich’s theology in light of the biographical considerations of his sex-
ual ethos. I conclude with a suggestion – contra MacKinnon – of the centrality of
ambiguity to Tillich’s life and his theology.
Résumé: L’auteur répond à l’influente critique de Donald MacKinnon contre Till-
ich. Dans son article de 1975 intitulé Tillich, Frege et Kittel : quelques réflexions
sur un thème sombre, MacKinnon déplore le “manquement de Tillich au niveau
de la foi” en revenant sur sa vie sexuelle. Après avoir esquissé l’argument de
MacKinnon en détail, l’auteur propose quatre différentes stratégies de réponses
disponibles pour ceux et celles qui souhaitent encore affirmer la valeur de la thé-
ologie de Tillich à la lumière des considérations biographiques de son éthos sex-
uel. L’auteur conclut en rappelant – contra MacKinnon – la centralité de l’ambi-
guïté pour la vie de Tillich et sa théologie.
In his highly influential essay “Tillich, Frege, Kittel: Some Reflections on a Dark
Theme” (written in 1975), the Scottish theologian Donald MacKinnon passed
judgement on Paul Tillich’s sex life and ambiguity.¹ Identifying Tillich as “Wei-
mar’s theologian,” MacKinnon finds in Tillich a “calculated, elaborately defend-
ed, yet always elaborately hidden perpetuation of a lifestyle involving an unac-
knowledged contempt…for the elementary, demanding sanctities of human
existence.”² Glossing MacKinnon‘s assertion of Tillich’s “shameless and heart-
less sexual promiscuity,” the Oxford historian of theology Diarmaid MacCulloch
has more recently wondered “how far any of Tillich’s theological work can be
taken seriously.”³ MacCulloch suggests that “one can without too many ethical
 Donald MacKinnon, “Tillich, Frege, Kittel: Some Reflections on a Dark Theme,” in Explora-
tions in Theology 5 (London: SCM Press, 1979): 129– 137.
 Ibid., 134–5.
 Diarmaid MacCulloch, Silence. A Christian History (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 202.
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problems rely on the professional expertise of a hypocritical car mechanic, but
the stock in trade of theologians is honesty, and the same rules do not
apply.”⁴ MacCulloch goes on to use the issue of Tillich’s supposed sexual corrup-
tion to introduce a discussion of clerical child abuse, ecclesial collusion with the
Nazi Holocaust and Christian attitudes towards slavery. His endorsement of
MacKinnon‘s judgement is widespread and for many, this is enough to deny Till-
ich a place as a legitimate theological voice.⁵
This essay will take up MacKinnon‘s critique. I begin with a brief reprisal of
MacKinnon‘s critique before considering four different strategies of response
open to those who wish nonetheless to continue to engage with Tillich. I suggest
that MacKinnon‘s objection to Tillich hinges on his claim that Tillich “suppresses
ambiguity” and consequently, in a more speculative final section, I take up the
question of ambiguity raised by MacKinnon to suggest an alternative, herme-
neutical image for understanding Tillich as the theologian of ambiguity par ex-
cellence.
1 Life
MacKinnon begins his essay with a brief discussion of Plato‘s Republic as “pin-
pointing one central problem of human existence, namely the relationship of
moral goodness to intellectual insight.”⁶ After a preliminary discussion of the
moral failings of Frege and Kittel, he turns to his main (dark) theme:
This topic is of peculiar significance at this time, as surely I am not alone in being deeply
disturbed by the books treating of the life of the theologian and philosopher Paul Tillich,
one by his wife Hannah, and one by an American psychiatrist who was his friend, Dr Rollo
May.⁷
MacKinnon notes that Tillich’s work is “very much discussed” and that he him-
self was present in Aberdeen when Tillich delivered his Gifford Lectures in 1953
and 1954.⁸ He gives a brief overview of Tillich’s career and concludes with these
telling words:
 Ibid.
 See also Frederick J. Parrella, “Does Life Imitate Art or Art Life? The Ambiguities in Paul Till-
ich’s Theology and in His Personal Life,” in this volume.
 Donald MacKinnon, “Tillich,” 133.
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
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His [Tillich’s] boldness in exploration, his frequent insights, his readiness to try to hold to-
gether seeming incompatibles – all have contrived to win him praise as well as to occasion
exasperation. It is an exploratory quality that has always marked his best writing, and it
came through full measure in his lecturing. Yet when I recall now his lectures at Aberdeen
twenty years ago, I ask myself what I am to make of the startling contrast between the staid,
sombrely dressed, elderly Professor, and the man living in those same years in the USA the
life his wife describes.⁹
And here, MacKinnon gets to his point:
Tillich emerges as ready to use his unquestioned powers as a teacher, as an intellectual
prophet, to attract women into his orbit, whom it would seem that he often seduced. He
emerges as wilfully promiscuous, and in his promiscuity coldly cruel towards his wife.¹⁰
Reflecting on incidents recounted in Hannah’s book and the “discernible elision
of awkward material” in Rollo May‘s, MacKinnon is led to conclude that “it is
simply NOT enough to say that one now sees him ‘warts and all.’” Rather,
“the flaws of which Hannah Tillich writes inevitably infect the texture of her hus-
band’s oeuvre.We are aware of an element of fraud, of hypocrisy here as so often
‘the tribute vice pays to virtue.’”¹¹
Warming to his theme, MacKinnon goes further:
But one is also aware of something that is of deeper significance…. Paulus and Hannah Till-
ich belonged to the world of [the] Weimar [Republic]: but it is not enough to say that Paulus
carried its ethos over into the world of his exile. It is the calculated, elaborately defended,
yet always equally elaborately hidden perpetuation of a life-style involving an unacknowl-
edged contempt not for traditional churchly forms (the sort of thing that the young Tillich
had known as a boy in his father’s house), but for the elementary, demanding sanctities of
human existence, that demands comment.¹²
Here MacKinnon turns to compare Tillich to Kittel, arguing that whilst Kittel’s
anti-Semitism was “a deadly infection” traceable to a widely shared misinterpre-
tation of Luther‘s two Kingdom doctrine, in Tillich’s case, by contrast, “we have
to reckon with the built-in risk of a deep corruption in a theology that would cul-
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This, then, finally seems to be MacKinnon‘s real concern: Tillich’s theological
temper – which he labels as “romantic” and “heroic” – presumably intending a
promethean attempt at daring originality. I quote at length:
The temptation that must beset the theologian whose temper is that of the explorer of the
unknown, even the forbidden territories of the world of ideas, is not to be identified too
quickly with a superior disdain for the proved simplicities of traditional wisdom. Rather
it is one of self-dramatization, of seeing himself in his own eyes as one taking upon himself
the most demanding and most frightening tasks, emancipated both by the aims, and in-
deed by the content of his enterprise from the discipline of a self-questioning that reaches
the very substance of what he is in himself…¹⁴
Against the Christian model of Christ’s “acceptance of unbearable ambiguity” in
his refusal of Satan’s temptation to cast himself down from the pinnacle of the
temple, MacKinnon sees in Tillich’s theology the “total emancipation from am-
biguity” as the key that unlocks his “failure at the level of faith.”¹⁵ He concludes
his essay with the following invocation:
All human faith depends upon, and is hardly decipherable mimesis, of the fides Christi, the
faith of Christ, that is itself human expression of God’s total fidelity to himself and to his
creation. And this faith of Christ we have most painfully to see as something that if we rest
our hope upon it, and find in it the source of our flickering charity, we must affirm for what
it was, and through the Resurrection, eternally is: response after the manner of God’s being
and of human need, no wilful wrestling of an unambiguous triumph over circumstance that
will, by its seeming transparency, satisfy our own conceit.¹⁶
Not quite a straight-forward attack on Tillich’s sexual mores, MacKinnon‘s under-
lying argument is more subtle and seemingly of greater consequence than an ex-
pression of distaste at Tillich’s behaviour. In essence, MacKinnon‘s argument
seems to be that Tillich’s sexual life is emblematic of his basic anthropology; de-
rived, MacKinnon affirms, from Tillich’s immersion in the decadent culture dur-
ing the Weimar Republic, symbolized by the images of cabarets and avant-garde
expressionism in Berlin after the First World War – a long way from the cultural
ambience of Aberdeen in the same period, I imagine! Tillich’s anthropology is
itself indicative of an even more basic theological metaphysics that MacKinnon
labels “romantic” and identifies with a suppression of ambiguity. The implica-
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tian” alternative to Tillich’s un-Christian “heroism” that embraces theological
ambiguity and thus avoids objectification and ensures unexploitative sexual re-
lations.
2 Sex
As someone who values Tillich’s theology (and the prominent place of ambiguity
within it) and who is troubled by the apparently problematic nature of his sexual
life, I propose to explore underlying argument of MacKinnon‘s essay by consid-
ering four responses to MacKinnon in turn, before in conclusion taking up an im-
plication of MacKinnon‘s characterisation of the temper of Tillich’s theology as
one of exploration of the unknown by suggesting that far from suppressing am-
biguity, Tillich’s theology is perhaps best characterised by the theme of ambigu-
ity.
The first possible response to MacKinnon‘s reflections is to affirm that MacK-
innon defames Tillich, who led a relatively normal and unproblematic sexual
life. It is not my intention to develop this response, but I do think that it is im-
portant to note a number of cautions to the unrestrained acceptance of Tillich’s
sexual life as unambigiously problematic. Hannah Tillich‘s account and Rollo
May‘s response, which provide the context for MacKinnon‘s reflections, are far
from unbiased neutral texts – both have a stake in presenting Tillich in a certain
light, which must be acknowledged. At the same time, care must be taken to
avoid tarring Tillich with the unambiguous brush of sexual predator; he was
clearly a charismatic and to some extent naive character – a powerful and poten-
tially dangerous combination. Finally, it is worth pausing to reflect before casting
the first stone: however one characterises Tillich’s sexual life, one must consider
to what extent is it uniquely problematic compared to those of other theologians,
much less subject to the kind of intense scrutiny that MacKinnon‘s essay epito-
mises.¹⁷ MacKinnon concludes his Reflections with reference to Christian life as
 A recent review of a volume of essays on the Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder com-
mends the collection for including an essay engaging with claims of Yoder’s sexual abuse of
women, before noting that “Tillich, Bonhoeffer and Barth‘s reputations have also been tarnished
by subsequent discoveries of their treatment of women.” Robin Gill, “Review: J. Denny Weaver
(ed.), John Howard Yoder: Biblical [sic.] Theologian (Cambridge: Lutterworth Press, 2015),” in
Theology 119:1 (Jan-Feb 2016): 78. The essay referred to is Ted Grimsrud, ‘Reflections from a Cha-
grined “Yoderian” in Face of his Sexual Violence,’ in John Howard Yoder. Radical Theologian, ed.
J. Denny Weaver (Eugene, Oregon, Cascade Books, 2014), 334–351. To my knowledge, there is
scant published reflection on this aspect of the lives (and theology) of Bonhoeffer and Barth.
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the “hardly decipherable mimesis of the faith of Christ:” we may at least question
what such a faith might look like in sexual terms. MacKinnon does not give us an
account, save to insist that it will have little to do with the “emancipation from
ambiguity” that he (mistakenly) identifies as characteristic of Tillich.¹⁸
A second possible response would be to assert that MacKinnon is wrong to
link Tillich’s sexual life to his theology and to suggest rather that the two should
be kept apart, much like the non-overlapping magisteria of the science-and-reli-
gion literature. To some extent, this approach repeats a laudable articulation of
the dangers of the ad hominem fallacy and it is surely necessary to affirm some
degree of separation between a thinker’s life and their ideas to be able construc-
tively to engage with anything written or taught by an imperfect person. As
MacKinnon himself confirms, Kittel’s racism does not invalidate the usefulness
of the Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, and as another example,
it is at least plausible to argue that the philosophical significance of Martin Hei-
degger‘s work is not diminished by his own political stance (a question that has,
of course, recently been revived by the publication of the so-called ‘black note-
books’).¹⁹ However, it is equally clear that when a person’s basic theoretical po-
sitions impact on their basic interpersonal relations, something needs to be said.
It is not that we should somehow expect better from religious leaders or theolo-
gians (as opposed to car mechanics and philosophers); rather this response
would insist that it is precisely Tillich’s own theology that demands that we rec-
For some information and commentary on Bonhoeffer‘s late engagement to and relationship
with Maria von Wedemeyer, see the editorial materials in Love Letters from Cell 92: Dietrich Bon-
hoeffer and Maria von Wedemeyer, ed. Ruth-Alice von Bismarck and Ulrich Kabitz, trans. John
Brownjohn (London: HarperCollins, 1994). See also Charles Marsh‘s recent biography for further
suggestions about Bonhoeffer‘s relationship with Eberhard Bethge, as well as Bethge’s own re-
flections on friendship: Charles Marsh, Strange Glory. A Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (New York:
Vintage, 2015), and Eberhard Bethge, Friendship and Resistance: Essays on Dietrich Bonhoeffer
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995). For Barth, the discussion concerns his relationship with
his academic secretary Charlotte von Kirschbaum and its implications for his family. See the dis-
crete references from Barth‘s later assistant Eberhard Busch: Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His
Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1976),
and Eberhard Busch, Meine Zeit mit Karl Barth. Tagebuch 1965–68 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
und Ruprecht, 2011). For more details, see Renate Köbler, In the Shadow of Karl Barth. Charlotte
von Kirschbaum, trans. Keith Crim (Louisville, KY:Westminster / John Knox Press, 1989), and Su-
zanne Selinger, Charlotte von Kirschbaum and Karl Barth. A Study in Biography and the History of
Theology (Philadelphia: Penn State University Press, 1998).
 Ibid., 136.
 For a recent, balanced engagement with the controversy caused by these publications, see
Reading Heidegger’s Black Notebooks 1931–41, ed. Ingo Farin and Jeff Malpas (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2016).
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ognise that everyday acts of making our way through the world have theological
significance for us and for others. The theologian of culture could hardly expect
us to prise apart sex and God,without cutting against the grain of the fundamen-
tal theological insight that religion and culture (including thereby theology and
sex) are inextricably interdependent. Thus, to claim that Tillich’s sexual ethos
and his theology have no relation would be to seek to isolate religion from cul-
ture – precisely that which Tillich railed against his whole life.
An alternative third response would accept that MacKinnon is correct to be
concerned about the relation between Tillich’s sexual life and his theology, but
would affirm that MacKinnon is wrong in his diagnosis of the problem. Instead
of MacKinnon‘s claim that Tillich’s theology undergirds and supports his life-
style, this response asserts by contrast that Tillich is inconsistent in applying
his theology to his life and, in effect, fails to live up to his theology. Had Tillich
lived consistently according to the fundamentals of his theology, then there
would be a very different story to tell. The claim here would be that Tillich’s the-
ology is not “romantic” in MacKinnon‘s problematic portrayal of that position,
but is instead “romantic” in a more genuine sense of being riven by ambiguity.
Tillich’s sexual life is, on this view, far from consistent with his theology and rep-
resents not its expression but its betrayal. With MacKinnon, then we might well
be disappointed in discovering tales of Tillich’s sexual lifestyle, but against
MacKinnon we could affirm in Tillich’s thought precisely the corrective criteria
that militate against such sexual failings. Tillich’s status as a thinker of the boun-
daries, his persistent attention to the ways in which Christian faith falls foul of
its own prescriptions (epitomised in his notion of the Protestant Principle) and
his unflinching recognition of the impermanence even of the most apparently
unshakeable religious symbols, all give us reason to question MacKinnon‘s ap-
pellation of Tillich as a “romantic” (in MacKinnon‘s sense). Indeed against MacK-
innon‘s claim that Tillich suppresses ambiguity, MacKinnon‘s account of Christi-
an faith as the “acceptance of unbearable ambiguity” could well have been
written by Tillich himself.²⁰ The real scandal, then, would be not that Tillich’s
theology undergirds his sexual life, but that it fails to do so.
 Possible citations in support of this claim abound, see, for instance the following character-
istically Tillichian discussion of doubt as a structural element in faith: “There is no faith without
an intrinsic ‘in spite of ’ and the courageous affirmation of oneself in the state of ultimate con-
cern. This intrinsic element of doubt breaks into the open under special individual and social
conditions. If doubt appears, it should not be considered as the negation of faith, but as an el-
ement which was always and will always be present in the act of faith.” Paul Tillich, Dynamics of
Faith (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 24–5.
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Perhaps, but finally, I want to suggest there is a fourth, more risky alternative
response that would move us beyond Tillich specifically and towards a more
constructive consideration of the difficult issues surrounding the theological im-
plications of sexual embodiment. In essence, my suggestion is that maybe MacK-
innon is actually simply a prude, whose attack on Tillich’s theology via his sex-
ual life is motivated more by his bourgeois morality than it is by genuinely
theological considerations. To put the point in a less ad hominem manner, my
claim is that Tillich’s sexual lifestyle does indeed enact his theology, precisely
as it moves beyond morality into theology of culture. Here a parallel is affirmed
between Tillich and Kierkegaard, in the recognition of a religious movement be-
yond ‘the ethical,’ that returns us to the first response, but from a different per-
spective. No longer is the concern one of condemning or justifying Tillich’s sex-
ual life in terms of the accepted criteria of morality; rather the issue now
becomes one of an interrogation of a theological account of sexual relations be-
yond the perspectives determined by morality.
When considering Tillich’s immersion in the “often widely experimental pe-
riod of the Weimar Republic,”MacKinnon refers to the welcome given to the Nazi
attainment of power in 1933 by many theologians, notably Karl Heim, who en-
dorsed the ‘moral renovation’ of German society by the purification of morals
being meted out by the Brownshirts.²¹ Heim and others, of course,were tragically
mistaken in their conflation of their repulsion at the lax morality (in particular
sexual morality) in the Weimar Republic with an embrace of Nazi puritanism.
In their moralistic distaste for the sexual experimentation of the post-War period,
they were too quick to reach for an apparently wholesome alternative. MacKin-
non shares their distaste, even as he resolutely turns to his understanding of the
demands of Christian theology (and not an alternative alluring political pro-
gramme) as his source of moral renovation. For MacKinnon, the Weimar ethos
is characterised by a contempt for “the elementary, demanding sanctities of
human existence” but we are never really given the reasons for this claim, al-
though we are to presume that it is related to his later characterisation of Tillich’s
theological temper as that of exploration.²² But why, and specifically why in the
arena of sexual relations, should Weimar experimentation (and its associated
theology of exploration) be any less respectful of the sanctities of human exis-
tence? Why, in other words, should such sanctities be grounded in (presumed)
moral certainties (as exemplified in its extreme form by the Nazi neo-puritanism)
and not in cultural and theological uncertainty?
 Donald MacKinnon, “Tillich,” 134.
 Ibid., 135.
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For MacKinnon, it seems, exploration (in theology as much as in sex) is un-
avoidably detrimental to life. To venture beyond accepted convention is for
MacKinnon to contest the authority of a given positum (be that of a particular
society or a particular received version of Christianity). We might share MacKin-
non‘s concerns about a theologian who, knowing better than the tradition, seeks
single-handedly to reinterpret it for himself (I use the male pronoun deliberate-
ly!); and yet surely we must be equally wary of the theologically quietistic model
of unquestioning acceptance. Of course, MacKinnon was no fideist and nor was
he a Kulturprotestant, and yet his confidence that experimentation can only
cause harm resonates with precisely the kind of theological positivism that Till-
ich’s whole theological programme seeks to resist. For Tillich, theology is intrins-
ically uncertain and it is perhaps precisely by embracing that uncertainty in life
– as well as in thought – that its basic demanding sanctities can be respected.
3 Ambiguity
In my third and final section, I turn more explicitly to the main theme of our Col-
loque: ambiguity. And here I wish to move beyond the debate about Tillich’s sex-
ual life and take up a line of thought provoked by MacKinnon‘s characterisation
of Tillich’s ethos (both his life and thought) as marked by a “total emancipation
from ambiguity.” The context is very different, but I cannot help but hear here
echoes of the postmodern condemnation of Hegelian modernity for its hubristic
desire comprehensively to enfold the world and all its ambiguities into the all-
embracing arms of sameness. This point is made specifically of Tillich and his
understanding of eros in the context of a 2010 article in Modern Theology by
Jan-Olav Henriksen.²³ In the course of comparing Tillich to Jean-Luc Marion,
Henriksen, without further elaboration, writes that “as a typically modern think-
er, Tillich is more concerned with unity than difference.”²⁴ Henricksen does not
elaborate, but such a view resonates with Thomas J. J. Altizer‘s disappointment
with the third volume of Tillich’s Systematic Theology, with its apparent collapse
of all of Tillich’s dialectical subtleties into the “end of history and the final con-
quest of the ambiguities of life.”²⁵
 Jan-Olav Henriksen, “Eros and/as Desire – A Theological Affirmation: Paul Tillich Read in
the Light of Jean-Luc Marion‘s The Erotic Phenomenon,” in Modern Theology 26:2 (2010): 220–
242.
 Ibid., 225.
 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 4.
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All three (MacKinnon, Altizer, and Henriksen) in their very different ways
seem to lament Tillich’s ‘heroic’ ‘modern’ ‘systematicity’ and, to the extent
that Tillich’s theology is read backwards as one of the last great monuments
to the power of human reason to comprehend and encompass the mysteries of
the Christian faith, the charge is perhaps not without merit. However, it is my
suggestion that such approaches significantly overemphasise Tillich’s ‘liberal’
system-building aspirations by, in effect, portraying him as always a crypto-con-
fessional theologian in thrall to that dangerous (Hegelian) temptation to identify
the insights of supposedly universal reason with the specifics of one particular
tradition. Of course, Tillich is, undoubtedly, a Christian theologian and he
does, undeniably, have a penchant for systemic structures (his thought is remark-
able for the rigour of its formal architecture, notwithstanding its frequent essay-
istic presentation), and there is a fairly strong dose of Hegelian modernism in
Tillich’s unstinting endeavour to correlate the message of the Christian faith to
the situation of “modern man.” And yet, there is another Tillich – more radical
perhaps? – whose life and thought subvert the liberal modern project and for
whom unresolved ambiguity is key. Far from an emancipation from ambiguity
in favour of speculative unity, this Tillich is unflinchingly committed to the em-
brace of difference and to the fractured – and fracturing – polyvalence of life, in
all its forms, conditioned and unconditioned.²⁶
John Thatamanil affirms Tillich’s postmodern credentials as ‘JewGreek;’
Mike Grimshaw writes of the ‘impurity’ of Tillich’s thought, and Dan Whistler
identifies Tillich as a ‘critical’ thinker, in whose work the drive for system is al-
ways held in tension with its crisis in freedom.²⁷ Perhaps, ambiguity can provide
an interpretative key to understanding – and appreciating – Tillich afresh: no
longer as a liberal accommodationist who either subdues traditional Christianity
to the latest shiniest forms of cultural expression or who answers such cultural
 For a related discussion of Tillich’s embrace of ambiguity, even in his doctrine of God, see
my ‘‘The Incompleteness of the Completed’: Eternal God, Eternal Life, and the Eternal Now,’”
in Eternal God, Eternal Life. Theological Investigations into the Concept of Immortality, ed. Philip
Ziegler (London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2016), 169– 187. More concretely, see the evidence for
Tillich’s ambiguous lifestyle as displayed during his trip to Japan in 1960, somewhat perplexing-
ly to his hosts: Paul Tillich – Journey to Japan in 1960, ed. Tomoaki Fukai (Berlin: de Gruyter,
2013).
 John Thatamanil, “Tillich and the Postmodern,” in The Cambridge Companion to Paul Tillich,
ed. Russell Re Manning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 288–302; Michael Grim-
shaw, “The Irrelevance and Relevance of the Radical, Impure Tillich,” in Retrieving the Radical
Tillich. His Legacy and Contemporary Importance, ed. Russell Re Manning (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015), 113– 132; Daniel Whistler, “The Critical Project in Schelling, Tillich and Good-
child,” in Retrieving the Radical Tillich, 209–232.
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impermanence with the comforting balm of a newly palatable traditional Chris-
tianity. Instead, this is the Tillich for whom theology is always theology of cul-
ture (even when presented as ‘Systematic Theology’) and for whom nothing –
neither contemporary culture nor traditional Christianity – can be allowed to os-
sify as the last word.
Tillich’s systematicity is constantly self-subverting; he is constantly drawn to
re-writing, spinning out system after system; not merely in light of new circum-
stances but rather on account of the basic instability of his thought. Here, the
helpful comparison is not with Hegel, who sought to impose the self-same struc-
tural rigour in every domain he encountered, but with Tillich’s real mentor,
Schelling, whose own career was marked – as was Tillich’s – by a constant re-
systematizing.
Ambiguity is defined by The Oxford English Dictionary as “the quality of
being open to more than one interpretation; inexactness” and this, I suggest,
gets us to the heart of Tillich. From the Latin ambigere (ambi and agere) ‘to dis-
pute about,’ ‘to wander about,’ [or] ‘to err,’ ambiguity captures perfectly the
‘double dealing’ that makes Tillich matter (and, perhaps, accounts for MacKin-
non‘s inability to recognise the staid professor he heard lecturing in Aberdeen
as the same man whose sexual lifestyle he read about with such distaste).
A final reflection. To characterise Tillich as a theologian of ambiguity pres-
ents a hermeneutical alternative to the predominantly topological images of Till-
ich that we have become habituated to, notably the image of the boundary,
which Tillich himself invoked of course.²⁸ The boundary image has served us
well, but perhaps it is time to supplement it with an alternative that allows Till-
ich’s genuinely dialectical duplicity to take centre stage. The image of the boun-
dary captures well the dual-faceted Tillich, but boundaries just as they demar-
cate are also themselves located; to be on the boundary is, in the end, to be
somewhere – and not somewhere else; it is, albeit in the most qualified sense
possible, still nonetheless an identity, an either/or. By contrast, the image of am-
biguity allows for a thoroughgoing both/and; to be ambiguous just simply is to
be unresolvable – like the ambiguous image of the Necker Cube or the duck-rab-
bit. I finish with a few lines from Philip Roth, another master of ambiguity, from
his 1986 novel The Counterlife, that capture the thoroughgoing sense of ambigu-
ity characteristic of Tillich – his theology and his life:
The burden isn’t either/or, consciously choosing from possibilities equally difficult and re-
grettable – its and/and/and/and/and as well. Life is and: the accidental and the immuta-
ble, the elusive and the graspable, the bizarre and the predictable, the actual and the po-
 Paul Tillich, On the Boundary (London: Collins, 1967).
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tential, all the multiplying realities, entangled, overlapping, colliding, conjoined – plus the
multiplying illusions!²⁹
 Philip Roth, The Counterlife (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 306.
50 Russell Re Manning
